-2020全球经济展望(宏观).docx
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1、Global Research 7EconomicsGlobalArend KapteynEconomist +44-20-7567 0531Seth CarpenterEconomist +1-212-713 4173Reinhard CluseEconomist +44-20-7568 6722Rafael De La FuenteEconomist +1-203-719 7127Gyorgy KovacsEconomist +44-20-7568 7563Pierre LafourcadeEconomist +1-203-719 8921James MalcolmEconomist +8
2、1-3-5208 6214Edward TeatherEconomist +65-6495 5965George TharenouEconomist +61-2-9324 3520Tony VolponEconomist +55-11-2767 6337Tao WangEconomist +852-2971 7525November 2018Global Economic PerspectivesGlobal Economic Outlook 2019-2020The end of low for longerThe aggregate global output gap closed in
3、Q2 this year, median unemployment is at the lowest level since 1980, wage pressures in many developed markets are approaching post-GFC highs (and in Japan at two-decade highs), labour shortages in several European countries with high unemployment seem as acute as in Germany (3% unemployment), and 72
4、% of countries already have headline inflation running above the central banks target-a share greater than during the 2003-2007 boom years. Economically, the global economy does not look like a patient in need of more monetary life support.But the evidence of being late cycle is at best mixedWe asse
5、ssed 120 prior late cycle episodes for 40 countries, and found that on several dimensions the behaviour of the data over the last four quarters in the US, Eurozone and Japan is completely incongruous with any of the recessions that took place since 1980. Employment growth in Japan, house price and p
6、roductivity growth in the US, core inflation in Europe, and various aspects of consumption and investment behaviour are not consistent with being near a business cycle peak. The central banks are thus understandably cautious. Despite core inflation in DM expected to be back above 2% by end 2019, on
7、par with pre-crisis levels, central banks are expected to lift their policy rates to only half of 2008/2009 levels by end 2020 and still be below neutral.And our now-casting models suggest the global economy is skiddingWe launch our global now-cast in this report and show how the deterioration in gl
8、obal hard and soft data is the most severe since the Eurozone crisis. We view the softness as transitory and we project consumption and investment to re-accelerate in 2020. But the knock to confidence this year is notable: survey implied growth globally has fallen from 4.9% to 3.5% YTD.Where do we d
9、eviate from 2019 consensus?We are significantly below consensus growth forecasts in 2019 for a large number of countries, including recession-hit Turkey (-160bp below consensus) and Argentina (- 200bp), several of the Asian economies (-80bp in Thailand and Malaysia), and also the Eurozone (-20bp). W
10、e are significantly above consensus on Japan (+70bp next year on growth and a similar magnitude on inflation) and Brazil (+70bp on growth). We remain more cautious on the US near term than most, because of tariff concerns, but are more constructive post-2020. The fiscal cliff is more like a gentle h
11、川一weve raised potential growth to 2% in 2020 and believe the Fed, after a pause, resumes hiking in 2021.What can go right?The biggest upside risks to our forecast are (i) trade tensions de-escalating; (ii) trade diversion effects being stronger than we think (we show for several Asian economies how
12、market share gains could outweigh value chain disruption); and (iii) the US growth acceleration being more structural.What can go wrong?The biggest downside risks are (i) central banks falling behind the curve if inflation surprises to the upside (on just a 50bp deviation from our inflation baseline
13、 we would see policy rates 70bp higher in DM); (ii) the US fiscal cliff being steeper than we project; (iii) US-China tariffs getting extended to all goods (we modelled the implications of USD/CNY potentially moving to 8.0); (iv) European peripheral debt stress intensifying on Italian debt concerns;
14、 (v) Brexit (weve estimated the global cost of a hard Brexit at roughly half of the US/China trade tensions); and (iv) oil prices being significantly above/below our baseline, which has a large (transitory) effect on policy rates in EM.This report has been prepared by UBS Limited. ANALYST CERTIFICAT
15、ION AND REQUIRED DISCLOSURES BEGIN ON PAGE 227.softens. This is somewhat puzzling because domestic demand in the G3 looks healthy and, in the case of the US, manufacturing production-which is typically comparatively import-intensive-has picked up significantly. Perhaps the overall slowing in US inve
16、stment YTD (ex-inventories) is the culprit, as it seems unlikely tariffs played a role earlier in the year. But the puzzle extends to the Eurozone and Japan, where import demand is slackening despite robust investment patterns (while confidence indices seem to be turning, capex intention surveys are
17、 holding up better than broader business sentiment ones). Whatever the case may be, the deceleration in trade volumes and prices has carried through to global industrial production and pulled the global economy down from last years lofty levels. Currently, EM Asia seems to be virtually holding up gl
18、obal import demand on its own. That is not sustainable, and the implementation of US/China tariffs should weigh yet more heavily on trade volumes.Trade aside, however, our baseline forecast for 19 and 20 is more constructive. We expect global economic growth to settle at roughly its long-run level (
19、3.7%). We generally still see ample slack to contain any undue acceleration in core inflation andprovided we are right-markets seem to be pricing central banks intentions pretty fairly for 2019.By the time we reach *20, however, things get a lot more uncertain. We spend considerable time below going
20、 through six alternative scenarios, including one where DM central banks fall behind the curve. The range of outcomes for growth, inflation and policy rates in those scenarios is vast, and much more interesting than the baseline.The difference between trade tensions escalating and de-escalating eith
21、er puts us 40bp below the global growth baseline or 20bp above. Trade escalation would lower our DM policy rate baselines substantially but increase them for EM (see our Scenario analysis further down for detail). Trade de-escalation does the opposite.The largest deviation from our baseline would co
22、me from us being wrong on the steepness of the US fiscal cliff. We think of it more as a gentle hill and have penc川ed in a minor growth drag. If we are wrong on that, combined with being wrong on a number of other assumptions, we get dramatically different outcomes for global growth (lower by nearly
23、 100bp), in part because of the disruption to financial markets. Most DM central banks would return to the lower bound, the Fed would resume QE, and despite some pressure on EMFX, even EM central banks would be cutting rates.An alternative scenario where central banks fall behind the curve on inflat
24、ion produces somewhat similar growth dynamics but is ultimately much less damaging in that the shock is self-correcting. The journey is volatile, however, with DM central banks raising their policy rates 70bp above our baseline if we are only 50bp wrong on our inflation forecast.We also explore the
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